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<Paper uid="P84-1012">
  <Title>Toward a Redefinition of Yea/No Questions</Title>
  <Section position="2" start_page="0" end_page="0" type="metho">
    <SectionTitle>
I INTRODUCTION
</SectionTitle>
    <Paragraph position="0"> If natural language interfaces to question-answering systems are to support a broad range of responses to user queries, the way these systems represent queries for response retrieval should be reexamined. Theorists of question-answering commonly define questions in terms of the set of all their possible \[true) answers.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="1"> Traditionally, they have defined t/us-no quesgiofts (YNQs) as propositional questions (?P) or as a special type of alternative question (?P V ?Q), in which the second alternative is simply the negation of the fir.~t (?P V ?&amp;quot;P). So 'Does Mary like skiing?' would be represented as flikr(lffary,skling) or ?like(Alary.okiing) V &amp;quot;~-Iikt(Mary, skiing) and the range of appropriate responses wouhl be gee, no and, possibly, unknown.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="2"> * &amp;quot; ilowever, both theoretleal wnrk and empirical studies of naturally occurring question-answer exchanges have shown this approach to be inadequate: ?~s, .o. and unknown form only a small portion of the set C/,f all appropriate responses to a YNQ. Furthermore, for some YNQ's. none of these simple direct responses alone i~ appropri:,te.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="3"> While it is widely recognized (llobbs, 1979, Pollack, 1982} that indirect resp.nses I to YNQs represent an important option for respondents in natural discourse, standard theories of question-answering have n,~t been revised accordiugly. A practical COllsPquence surface~ when attempts are made t.o support indirect responses to YNQs computationally. For lack of alternative representations, question-answering systems which would permit indirect responses must still represent YNQs as if the direct respons-s were the 'norm', and then resort to ad hoe manipulations to generate second-class 'indirect' responses, thus perpetuating an asymmetric distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' responses.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="4"> However. resea.'h under way on how a type of generalized conversational implieatttre, termed here scalar irrtplieature, can be used to guide the generation and iaterpretion of indirect respt,nses to YNQs sugges/,s a revi~ed representation fi)r YNQs which scrotums)dates a wide variety of responses in a uniform way.</Paragraph>
  </Section>
  <Section position="3" start_page="0" end_page="0" type="metho">
    <SectionTitle>
II CURRENT REPRESENTATIONS OF YNQ, S
</SectionTitle>
    <Paragraph position="0"> Among st:~ad:,rd accounts of Y=NQs, I-lintikka's (l.lh:tik.~a, 197~) is one of the shnl)lest and mo~t widely accepted, c~.,mbinh~g the llndirect r~sponses to YNQs tr~ defined h~:re as responses other than lltR, n0, or some expression of ignorance.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="1"> concepts of YNQ&amp;quot; as pn,positional question &amp;quot; and as alternative question; as such, it will be used below to represent traditional approaches in general. To define attswerhood, the conditions under which a response eonnts as an answer to a natural-language query, Hintikka divides qneriq~s into two parts: an imperative or optaGve operator {\[). roughly expressing 'bri,g it about that', and a daesideratu~,n, a specification of the epistemie state a questhmer desires. For Hintikka, a YNQ is a ~peciai case of alterna(Jve question in which the negative alternative 'or not P' has been suppressed. So the desideratum of a YNQ is of the fC/~rm (\[ know thai P) V {I kin, u, that #t~3+P}. where net-l- indicates the negation-fi)rming process. 'Does Mary like skiing?' thus has a.s its desideratum I know that ,~htrg li\];e.* skiing or I kno~ ihat Aiary does not like skiing, or, more concisely, fK~Jike{Marg, skling) V Ks~likc{'Marll, ekiing), where K S is the epistemic representatitm of 'S knows that'. The full sense of the query is then 'Bring it aboot that 1 know that Mary likes skiing or that I know that Mary does not like skiing', which can be represented by ! \[KsP V K.~',P).</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="2"> Possible resp.nses are simply {P,-,P}, or {yes,no).</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="3"> A. tI_~othesls Confirmation Bolingcr (Boliuger, 1978) has called such interpretations into question by showing that YNQs may have very different meanings from their alternatlve-questioa counterparts; they also have more restricted paraphrase and intonation patterns. In 13oliuger's view the term I/US-no qtterl/ has hypnolized scholars into a.ssurrling that, simply because a class of question can be answered by a 2us or no, the~ altern:ttives are critcrial, and every YNQ is intended to elicit, one or the other. He proposes instead that YNQs be viewed as hypotheses put forward for confirmation, arncadmenL or  diseonfirnladon - in any degree. Thus, in Bolinger's exampie (l), the (1) Q: Do you like llonolnlu? R: Just a little.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="4"> questioner (Q)'s hypothesis 'you like tloaoh, iu' is amended by ~he respondent (R) in a re.-ponse v, hich is neither .t, es n,~r no bnt somewhere in between. In his example (2), Q's hypothesis 'it is (2) Q: Is it difficult? R: It's imposeS'de.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="5"> difficult' is confirmed by R's as,ertion of a more positive resi~onse than a simple go.;.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="6">  While Bolingcr makes a good ca'.:.e for the inadequacy of sttmdard views of YNQs, the revisi,m hv I)mposes is itself :,~, \]i,tited. '~t',~ imp~,~ible', in (2). d.',e:; n:,.'e than simply pr~'-,..t a strong affirmation of the hypoth,'~is 'it is dilficult' - it Frovid~ new :'.rid unrequested though perlit..nt inr,,r.tati.n. In fact, 'str,mg affirmation' might better t)e provided by a respon.-e -.uch as '1 am absolutely sure it's difficult' than by &amp;quot;he response he suggests. And ther,~ are equally appropriate responses to the queries in (l) and {2) that are not easily explained in terms of degree of hypotl~esis confirmatit,n, u.~ shown iu (3) and (4).</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="7">  (:~;) Q: 1),, you like ! h,,a.hllu? a. R: I don't like llawaii.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="8"> b. R: I lik~- Ililo.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="9"> (4} t~: Is it dif~'icult? a. l,': It could be.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="10"> b. It: Mike says so.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="11">  Finally, l~.ii~ger does not propose a representatiozt to accommodate hi~ hy~,~,the~is-confirmation model.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="12"> B. Fo~oesed YNf~.~ Similarly, Ki,'fer (Kid,for, 19~;0) points out evidence for the inadt,quacy of the standard view of YNQs, but proposes no unified sohrti.n. In a stt~dy of the indirect speech acts that may be p~.rh~rm,'d I,? &amp;quot;(NQ~, h,&amp;quot; nc~le~ that certain YNQs, which he terms .focussed YTVQs, aetu:dly function as v,h-queslions. Focussed YNQs I'C/,r Kit'f,'r are YNQs that are marked in some way (:~l)parenlly by sire:.~ i to il~di,.ate a background aasuntption which Q and l{ typic:ally share. For example, (Sa) is not a focussed YNQ while {Y~bHY, d ) are. While any of the four may be auswrted with 9~,~ or  a. 1.~ John h,aving for .~tockholm tomorrow? b. Is .Mhn leaving for Stockholm TOMORROW? c. Is John h.aviug for STOCKIR~I.M tomorr,~w? d. \[s JOIIN leaving fi~r St~wkh.~dm tom~)rrow?  no, ii is also po~.ii,le that, if Q a~ks (,Sb). she want~ R to answer the question 'When is Johi! leaving for Stockholm?'; if she a.,;ks (Se) she may want to know 'Where is John going tomorrow?'; and if she asks (Sd) she may want to know 'Who is leaving for Stockhohn tomorrow?&amp;quot; Titus a f,~cussed YNQ resemhles the wh-question that might be formed by replacing the focussed element in the desideratum with a corresponding Pro-element. In Kiefer's analysis, only one eh't~ent can he focussed, so resl~mses such as 'lie's leaving for Paris Thursday' will not be accommodated. Although Kiefer does not propose a representation for focugsed YNQs, a di..:j,nc! resembling the desideratum of a wh-question might I,e added to the traditional representation to areommodate his third :tlterna|ive: for (5d} this might take the form 'Is John leaving for Stoekhohn tomorrow, or, if not, who is?' or, in</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="14"> This represenl.atiou reflects another problem posed by Kiefer's analysis: the third disjunet is appropriate only when the second also is and not when the direct response ~les is true. For example, a response of 'Bill is' to (Sd) seems to convey that John h not leaving for Stockhoha tomorrow. Thus viewing some YNQs as wh*qm,,qions req.ires a rather more coml~lex representation than simply adding a wh-question as a third disjunct. * In addition, defining different representations for various YNQ subtypes seems a le~s than satisfactory solution to tbe linfitations presented by current representations of YNQs. A more unified solution to the problems identified by Bolinger and Kiefer would clearly be desirable. Such a solution is suggested by current research on the role conversational implieature plays in accounting for indirect re.~pons~s to YN~.~)s.</Paragraph>
  </Section>
  <Section position="4" start_page="0" end_page="50" type="metho">
    <SectionTitle>
III CONVERSATIONAL I'MPLICATURE AND YNQS
</SectionTitle>
    <Paragraph position="0"> In a large cl:~s of in,!irect respon:~e.~ to YNQs, query and response each refi, r to an entity, attribute, state, activity, or event that can bo viewed as appearing on sorae eea~e; such references &amp;quot;In f~et, the third di~jon~t would have to be something like</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="2"> aThe idea.~ outlined in the following section are discussed in more detail in (tlir,~rhberg, 1984).</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="3"> will be termed scalars and responses in such exchanges will be termed scalar responnes, s In such scalar exchanges, questioners can infer both a direct response and additional implicit information flora the unreqm'sted information provided by the respondent. In  {0) for example, Q is entitled to infer the direct response no or I don &amp;quot;~ know (6) Q: Are mushrooms poisonous? R: Some are.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="4">  and the additional information that It believes that there may be mushrooms that are not poisonous, ew, n though 3z(rnashroom(z) A poism~ous(x)) does not IogicMly i-,{v an)&amp;quot; of this information. Clearly 'Some are' is an appropriate r,.~pouse to the query - more appropriate in fact than a simple no, wllich might convey that. no mushrooms are poisonous - but what makes it appropriate? Grire's (Grice, 1975) Cooperative Principle claims that, without contrary evide~cp, participants in convers~.tion assume their partners are trying to be cooperative. In consequence, they recognize certain conversational maxims, such as Grice's Mnzirn.  of Quantit|l u I Make your eoutribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="5"> b) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="6"> and his ~,~azint ol QuoJity Try to make your contribution one that is true.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="7"> a) Do not say what you believe to be false.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="8"> b) Do not. say that for which you I~k adequate evidence.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="9"> Speaker and hearer's mutual recognition of these maxims may give rise to eort~erscttional ~mp~ieaturen: An utterance eonveraatios~allll intp~icates a proposition P when it conveys P by virtue of the bearer's assumption of the speaker's cooperativeness. While s speaker may not always obey the~e maxims, the hearer's expectations are based on her belief that such conventions represent the norm.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="10"> A. Scalar Pred|eatlon  Following Grice, Horn {flora, 1972) observed that, when a speaker refers to a value on some scale defined by eentantl,&amp;quot; entai|ment 4, that value represents the highest value on its scale the speaker can t ruthful!y affirm. The speaker is saying as much {Quantity) as she truthfully (Quality) can. Higher values on that scale are thus implicitly marked by the speaker as not known to be the case or known not to be the ease. 5 Values lower on the scale will of course be marked as true, since they are entailed. Horn called this phenomenon scalar predleation, and Gazdar {Gazdar, 1979) later used a variation as the basis for a phenomenon he termed sea/at quantity irrtp\[ieature. Here a much revi~d and extended version will be termed scalar implleature.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="11"> Horn's simple notion of scalar predication does provide a principled ba.~is for interpreting ({3) attd similar indirect responses to YNQs where scales are defined by entailment. Some is the highest value on a quantifier scale that R can truthfully affirm. Truthdegvalues of higher scalars such as all are either unknown to R or believed by him to be false. Thus, if Q recognizes R's implieature, roughly, 'As far as 1 know, not all mushrooms are poisonous', she will derive the direct response to her query as no or I don ~ know. H must believe either that some mushrooms are not poisonous or that some mushrooms may not be poisonous.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="12">  dC/ It is also important to note that, in (6), were R simply to deny Q's query or to assert ignora~ce with a simple \[ don't know, Q would be entitled, by virtue of the Cooperative Principle, to assume that there is no scalar value whose truth R can in fact affirm. That is, Q can assume that, as far as R knows, there are no mushrooms that are poisonous, for otherwise R could commit himself to the proposition that 'some mushrooms are poisonous'. More generally then, 1-~ is obliged by the Cooperative Principle, and more especially by Joshi's (Josh}, 1982) modification of Grice's Maxim el Qua/itl/: 'Do not say anything which may imply for the hearer something which you the speaker believe to be false.', to provide an indirect response in (6), lest a simple direct response entitle Q to conclude some ,fa/,e iwtplieaturee. Thus indirect responses must be included among the set of all appropriate responses to a given YNQ, since in some cases they may be the most appropriate response R can make.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="13"> B. Scalar Impllcature While scalar predication provides a principled explanation for {6), a revised and extended notion of aea/ar irrtplieature can account for a much larger class of indirect responses to YNQs. It can also suggest a revised representation of YNQs in general based upon this enlarged class of appropriate responses.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="14"> Order}ors not defined by entailment and order}rigs other than linear orderings, including but not limited to set/set-member, whole/part, process stages, spatial relationship, prerequisite orderings, entity/attribute, lea hierarchy, or temporal ordering, permit the conveyance of scalar implicatures in much the same way that the entailed quantifer scale does in (6)~ In (7) the set/  member (7) Q: Did you invite the Reagans! R: I invited Nancy.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="15"> (8~ Q: }lave you finished the manuscript?  It: I've started a rough draft.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="16"> relati,,nship orders the Rcagans and Nancy; R implicates that he has not invited Ronald, for instance. In 18), starting a rough draft precedes finishing a manuecript in the process of preparing a paper. So Q is entitled to conclude that R has not finished the manuscript or completed any later stage in this process, such as finishing the rough draft.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="17"> More formally, any set of referents {bl,...,bn} that can be partially ordered by a relation O s can support scalar implicature. Any scale S that permits scalar implicature can be represented as a partiallg-ordered eet. For any referents bt, b z on S, b 2 is higher on S than b I iff blOb2; similarly, b I is lower on S than b~ iff blOb ~. Any pair b 1, b~ of ineontparable elements (elements not ordered with respect to one another by O) will be termed alternate values with respect to S. This redefinition of scale accommodates order}ors such as those mentioned above, while excluding orderings such as cycles, that do not permit scalar implieatute. It also helps define the inferences licensed when \[t affirms a higher or an alternate value, or when he denies or asserts ignorance of lower, higher, or alternate valses. For example, R affirms a higher scalar value than the value queried in Bolinger's example reproduced in (2). If difficult and impo.~Mble are viewed on a scale defined in d,.grees of feasibility, then Q can conclude that by affirming ghc higher value H has affirmed the lower. Similarly, R may affirm an alternate value, as he d~s in (3h}. If II sees Honoluh |and Hilo as b~,th members of a set of Hawaiian cities, he can affirm an unqueried set member (ltilo) to deny a queried member {llawaii). The affirmati,~n of an unqueried ah,'rnate value generally conveys the falsity or R's ignorance of the queried value.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="18"> SA partial ord~-rin 9 may be defined as an irreflexive, tsymmr-trie, and transitive rel~.tiou.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="19"> Speakers may also license scalar implicat,ires by denying scalars. The dual to Horn's notion of affirming the highest affirmable v:due would be negating the lowest deniable scalar. In such a denial a speaker may implicate his affirmation or ignorance of lower  scalars. So, in exchanges like {9a), a value higher than a queried value {here, (9} Q: Did you write a check for the rent? a. R: l haven't mailed it yet.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="20"> b. R: I haven't signed it.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="21"> c. R: I didn't pay cash.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="22">  a stage in the process of mortgage payment) may be denied to convey the truth of the queried value. R may also deny lower values (gb) or alternate vahscs (9c}.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="23"> So, indirect scalar responses may be defined UlU,n a number of metrics and may involve the affirmation or negation of higher, lower, or alternate values. They may also involve the affirmation or denial of more than one scalar h~r a single query, as shown in (10). Ash';nine that Mary and Joe are brother and s:ster and both are known to Q and tL Also, Mary and Tim are fellow-workers with Q and R. Then to Q's question in {10), R may felicitously respond with any or the  (10) Q: Does Mary like skiing? a. R: She loves iee-gkating.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="24"> b. R: ,Joe loves cross-country.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="25"> e. R: Tim likes cros~country.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="26">  answers given - as well a~s a variety of others, such as 'Site n~ed to' or even 'Joe used to love ice-skating.' That is, R may base his response upon any one or more scalars he perceives as invoked by Q's query. In addition, a single lexical it(:m (here Mary} may invoke more than one scale: R may view Mary as a member of a family or of a set of fellow-workers, for example, to generate responses (10b) and (ll}c), respectively.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="27"> C. A Scalar Representation of YNQs.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="28"> Given this characterization of appropriate indirect responses, it is possible to model the exchanges present,,d above in the following  way: 1. For some query uttered by Q, let P V &amp;quot;P represent the query's desideratum; 2. Let Pxl/bl,x2/b2,...,Xn/bnV-Pxl/b~,xg/b2,...,Xn/bn represent the open propozition formed by substituting variables x I for each b i ir~vokcd by P that R perceives as lying on some scMe Si; 3. Then P V'P * J~X,~z/xa,...,~n/Xn ~/%,%/~.,,...,.~Jx,, defines the set ~.,f possible responses to Q's query, where each a I repre.-.ents some scalar coo*currier with its corresponding b i on S i.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="29"> 4. A subset of these p~,ssit.qe re~ponses, the set of possible  true respcmses, will be det~.rmined by 1C/ from his knowledge ba0:c, and an actual r~'sponsc ~l~lectcd. 7 In 16), for example, the de.-.ider:dum {P V &amp;quot;q&gt;) of Q's query is the generic '(all) mushrooms are poisonous' V 'not (all) mushrooms are poisonous', tiers R might perceive a single scalar all lying on a quantifier scale, ,onc//~C/ome/all. So, 'x I mushrooms are poisonous' V 'not x I \[all,brooms ace poisonous' represents the (,pen proF-sition formed b) substituting a variable for all in P, where x! ranges over the values on SI. nor~,/oorn,~/u!l. Then the set of p..-.ible resp(.n~:.~ tt, t~'s query, given P~'s choice of seal:~r, is dt,fin~.d by the affirmatiml or ~wgati~m of cach of the possible instantiations of 'al/x I mushrooms at, ~ poisonous', or the set {no nlushrool/is are poisoIIOUS.SO.~le L'lushfooIIlS are poisonous.all mushrooms are poisonous,-nno mushrooms are poisonons, -some 7S~.e lliir~ehberg, l~t~41 rr.r farth~ r diseusslon of this self'ca}on process.  mushr-on~s :~r~ poisonous, ~ail r:,,a,hro,~ms are poisonous}. The set of po,.-ibh, true r,.sponscs will be a subset of this set, determined b)' It from Iris knowh:dgc ba.se. Note that a I and b l may in fact be identical. Thus, the simple direct responses, equivalent to 'All mushrooms are poisonous' and 'Not all mushrooms are poi.~t)nous', are accorumodated in this schema. Thi~ charact~,riz:ttion of potcnt.ial response.-, suggests a new repre~entath)n for YNt~s. l'oih)wing Hintikka, one might paraphrase the query in (6) as 'Bring it about that I know that x t mushro~Jnls are poisonous r~r that I know that. not x t mushrooms art.' poisonous t, where x I range~ over the values on some scale S t up.n which the qlo'ried v:due .~om( appears (assuming a many-sorted epi~temic logic). Thus the query alight be represented as ! 3~l.~X I (so:;,e,xtENtA {KQ(X I mushrooms are pois,,nou~) V KQ~(X t mi, shrooms are poisonous)}}.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="30"> For a query like that in (It)), an appropriate representation might be:</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="32"> lI may then instantiate each variable with any value from its domain in his response.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="33"> In the gem'ral e~e, then, YNQs might be represented as 3SI,...,:JSa3xI,...,3x~, {bI,x1ES 1 A .... A bn,XnCS a A {KQ(l'x I ...... n) V Kq'{Pxt ...... n )}&amp;quot; This representation shares some features of standard representations of wh-qm.stions, .~uggesting that it simply extends Kiefer's view of foct:s~ed &amp;quot;fNQs to all YNQs. However, there are several :dgnificant di~tincthms between this representation and standard repres,.ntatioas of wh-questk)ns, and, thus, between it and Kiefer's suggesthm. First, it restricts the domains of variables to scales invoked by corresponding scalars in the original queries desideratum and it includes a negative disjuuet. 'Do you like Ilonolulu?' for example might have as its desideratum  while the corresponding wh-question 'What do you like?' would have as its desideratum 32 lfQfVou like z). Second, the representation prop,sed here allows for reference in a query to muhiple scalars, or, multiple focii, which Kiefer does not consider. Third, it awJids both the division of YNQs into focussed and nonfocussed queries and the dependency between wh-responses and negative responses noted above; hence, the representation is simpler and more unified. So, YNQs are not represented as whquestions, although Kiefer's focussed YNQs can be accommodated in this more general representation, which 1 will term a ~eel~,&amp;quot; repreae~tatlo~.</Paragraph>
  </Section>
  <Section position="5" start_page="50" end_page="50" type="metho">
    <SectionTitle>
IV DISCUSSION
</SectionTitle>
    <Paragraph position="0"> A scalar representation of YNQs can accommodate a wide range of direct and indirect responses which are common in natural discourse but which current representations of YNQs cannot support. Of course, such a redefinition is no panacea for the limitations of current representations: In its current form, for instance, there are sonic appropriate responses to indirect speech acts, such as (ill, which it  (11) Q: Can you tell me the time? R: It's 5:30.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="1"> will not support. In other exchanges, such as {12), the notion of seale may seem less tha,~ natural, where a scale like attribute* of a (12) Q: Is she pretty? R: She's married.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="2">  potcnHal date.: {pr~:ttg, unmarried,...} must be postulated to accommodate this query in the the representation proposed here. Too, tbe actual representation of a particular query may vary according to participants' differing perception of scalars invoked by it, as shown in (I0). Because scales are not defined in absolute terms, it is difficult to determine even an abstract specification of the set of all possible responses to a given query; should temporal and modal variables always be understood as implicitly evoked by any query, for example, as in {13)? However, if broad categories of sucb  (13) Q: Is Gloria a blonde? a. R: She used to be.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="3"> b. R: She could be.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="4">  'understood' scales can be identified, much of this difficulty might. be alleviated. The representation proposed here does accommodate a far larger class of appropriate responses than representations previously suggested, and accommodates them in a unified way. With further refinement it promises to provide a useful tool for theoretical and computational treatments of YNQs.</Paragraph>
  </Section>
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