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<Paper uid="J84-1001">
  <Title>A Knowledge Representation Approach to Understanding Metaphors</Title>
  <Section position="4" start_page="0" end_page="0" type="intro">
    <SectionTitle>
4. Prototypicality
</SectionTitle>
    <Paragraph position="0"> Another valuable contribution coming out of cognitive psychology is prototype theory (Rosch 1973, Rosch and Mervis 1975), which holds that a concept may belong to a category even if it is somewhat atypical in terms of the predicates usually (typically) associated with members of that category. A chicken is a bird even though it can't really fly. Here, bird refers to some prototype from which chicken represents a departure. null In terms of metaphors, there is much value in ineluding prototype theory in any model. For example, (4) Mary's cheeks are like apples 10rtony acknowledges that the att.!butes may be similar, not identical, in the vehicle and topic (1979a, p. 167). While I am in agreement with Ortony, I will, for the purposes of this paper, make the assumption of predicate identity.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="1"> 2 In testing this hypothesis experimentally, Gentner (1980) showed that salience did not appear to be a relevant mechanism in metaphor processing. This seems to me, however, to be partially a result of how salience was measured and the need for a clearer analysis of how metaphoric interpretation proceeds. Salience, properly defined, may provide a necessary but not sufficient explanation. null</Paragraph>
  </Section>
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