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<Paper uid="J91-1003">
  <Title>met*: A Method for Discriminating Metonymy and Metaphor by Computer</Title>
  <Section position="11" start_page="83" end_page="86" type="concl">
    <SectionTitle>
7,4 Metaphor
</SectionTitle>
    <Paragraph position="0"> Metaphor recognition in the met* method is related to all four views of metaphor described in Section 2, consisting of:  a contextual constraint violation, such as a preference violation -- as in the selection restrictions view; a set of &amp;quot;correspondences&amp;quot;-- rather like the system of commonplaces in the interaction view; a relevant analogy -- cf. the comparison and interaction views; with analogies that fall into patterns not unlike conceptual metaphors found in the conventional view.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="1"> In CS, the presence of metaphor has been investigated in violations of preferences, a kind of lexical contextual constraint. Though clearly this is a small part of the picture, it seems worth establishing an extensive picture of preference violation and metaphor before moving on to other contextual constraints.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="2"> Collation and the met* method have certain similarities with the comparison view of metaphor, especially in the cell matching process. The relevant analogies discovered in CS are indeed, to quote Tourangeau and Sternberg, &amp;quot;a comparison in which one term.., is asserted to bear a partial resemblance to something else.&amp;quot; The collation process gives quite a clear picture of the ground and tension in a metaphor. The ground is the most specific statement that subsumes both statements that figure in the analogy, e.g., \[it1, ingest1, liquid1\] is the ground for the analogy involving \[animal1, drink1, drink1\] and \[carl, use2, gasoline1\] (see Figures 8 and 9). Moreover, the details of the process match well Aristotle's two basic principles for finding the ground of a metaphor in that both terms in a metaphorical relation belong</Paragraph>
    <Section position="1" start_page="84" end_page="86" type="sub_section">
      <SectionTitle>
Fass Discriminating Metonymy
</SectionTitle>
      <Paragraph position="0"> to a common category (in the example above, the common categories are it1, ingest1, and liquid1) and an analogy is found between them.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="1"> The collation process also takes care of many of the problems Tourangeau and Sternberg (1980) note with the comparison view. Regarding the problem that &amp;quot;everything shares some feature or category.., with everything else,&amp;quot; CS is in agreement: the only significant combination of features in a metaphor are those involved in a relevant analogy. The problem that &amp;quot;the most obvious shared features are often irrelevant,&amp;quot; i.e., that the most obvious shared features are irrelevant to a metaphor, is borne out by experience with CS -- for example, animals and cars share some basic physical objectlike properties, but these have a minor role in understanding cars drinking. The met* method bears out another problem that, &amp;quot;even when a feature is relevant, it is often shared only metaphorically.&amp;quot; Finally, with the problem that novel metaphors cannot be based on &amp;quot;extant similarities,&amp;quot; -- the relevant analogies found in the met* method are not &amp;quot;extant&amp;quot; but have to be actively discovered.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="2"> In Section 2, two main differences were noted between the interaction and comparison views: first, that similarities are &amp;quot;created&amp;quot; in the interaction view, whereas only pre-existing similarities are found in the comparison view, and second, that a whole system of similarities are evoked in the interactions view, unlike the comparisons view, which focuses upon finding a single similarity. Regarding the first difference, I would argue that the difference is a mistaken one and that interaction theorists are simply using a sophisticated form of comparison. This is quite evident when one examines, for example, the methods Tourangeau and Sternberg propose for relating features across domains in their theory. The second of Aristotle's basic principles is finding an analogy, yet Tourangeau and Sternberg (1982, p. 218) themselves say that, &amp;quot;in a sense, we are proposing that metaphors are analogies that include both tenor and vehicle and their different domains as terms.&amp;quot; And, of course, finding an analogy is central to the met* method on CS.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="3"> Regarding the second difference, I would agree that finding a system of commonplaces is distinctive. However, the extensions to CS described in Section 6 move toward the direction of finding a system of commonplaces in that the deeper semantic vectors, and sentence representations shown in Figures 20 and 21 contain the information crucial to finding a system of commonplaces. Having identified the crucial analogy in (20), the deeper semantic vector contains the two pairs of matched relevant cells that provide the core analogy on which the metaphorical interpretation of (20) is built: \[\[animal1, drink1, drink1\], \[carl, use2, gasoline1\]\] \[\[animal1, drink1, drink1\], \[vehicle1, use2, gasoline1\]\] With this information at hand, the sense-frames for word senses in analogical correspondence -- the verb senses drink1 and use2, the noun senses animal1 and carl, animal1 and vehicle1, and drink1 and gasoline1 -- can be systematically expanded to uncover deeper commonplaces between animals and cars.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="4"> In conclusion, the view of metonymy and metaphor in the met* method is consistent with much of the literature on these phenomena. The met* method is consistent with the view that the primary function of metaphor is understanding while that of metonymy is referential, like anaphora. Nevertheless, metonymy and metaphor do have much in common: both might be described as forms of &amp;quot;conceptual ellipsis,&amp;quot; a shorthand way of expressing ideas.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="5">  Computational Linguistics Volume 17, Number 1 The met* method in its present serial form recognizes literalness, metonymy, metaphor, and anomaly in the following order and by the following characteristics.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="6">  The above analysis also illustrates, I hope, why metonymy and metaphor are easily confused: both are nonliteral and are found through the discovery of some aspect (a property) shared by the source, a preference, and the target, in the above case a surface noun. The differences are (a) how that aspect is selected, (b) the operations that follow, (c) the effect those operations produce, and (d) subsequent processing.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="7"> In the case of metonymy, (a) the selected aspect forms a regular semantic relationship with a property from the target; (b) there is substitution, i.e., replacement of one concept with another; (c) hence the apparent referential function of metonymy; and (d) is unclear at present.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="8"> In the case of metaphor, (a) the selected aspect is relevant; (b) forms an analogy with another aspect from the target; and (c) the effect is of surprise discovery of similarity between the two concepts; and (d) the discovered analogy is used to unearth further similarities between the two concepts (i.e, to deepen the analogy) and to guide subsequent sentence interpretation. Moreover, the view of metaphor in CS contains elements of the selection restrictions view, the comparisons view, and the interactions view of metaphor.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="9"> It should be emphasized that the met* method has only been applied to a small set of English sentences. Metonymy interpretation has been investigated only for adjective-noun and subject-verb-object constructions; metaphor interpretation, only for the latter. The best avenue for progress with the met* method appears to be the extensions to metaphor interpretation described in Section 6. In the meantime I am looking for sentences that contain semantic relations consisting of a metonymy (or chain of metonymies) followed by a metaphor.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="10"> Example 32 &amp;quot;America believes in democracy&amp;quot; (Hobbs 1983b, p. 134).</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="11"> On a related point, some sentences are interesting in this respect because they have either a metaphorical or metonymic interpretation. In (32), for example, &amp;quot;Are we viewing America metaphorically as something which can believe, or are we using it metonymically to refer to the typical inhabitant, or the majority of inhabitants, of America?&amp;quot; (Ibid., p. 135).</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="12"> Example 33 &amp;quot;Prussia invaded France in 1870.&amp;quot; Sentence (33), which was discussed in a group working on beliefs at the CRL (see Acknowledgments), also has separate metonymic and metaphorical interpretations.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="13"> The key semantic relation is between 'Prussia' and 'invade.' The relation is nonliteral because 'army' is the expected agent of 'invade' and 'Prussia' is a country, not an army. What, then, is the semantic relation between 'Prussia' and 'army'? One possibility is</Paragraph>
    </Section>
    <Section position="2" start_page="86" end_page="86" type="sub_section">
      <SectionTitle>
Fass Discriminating Metonymy
</SectionTitle>
      <Paragraph position="0"> that a chain of metonymies is involved, that the army is controlled by the government which also controls Prussia. A second possibility is that Prussia is understood metaphorically as being an animate thing that extends itself into France.</Paragraph>
    </Section>
  </Section>
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