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<Paper uid="P79-1022">
  <Title>APPLICATIONS</Title>
  <Section position="1" start_page="0" end_page="89" type="abstr">
    <SectionTitle>
APPLICATIONS
DAVID G, HAYS
HeXagram
</SectionTitle>
    <Paragraph position="0"> Truth, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder, Z offer a few remarks for the use of those who seek a point of view from which to see truth in the six papers assigned to this session.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="1"> Linguistic computation is the fundamental and primitive branch of the art of cumputatlon~ as I have remarked off and on. The insight of yon Neumann~ that operations and data can be represented in the same storage device, is the linguistic insight that anything can have a name in any language. (Whether anything can have a definition is a different question.) I recall surprising a couple of colleagues with this r~ark early in the 1960s, when I had to point out the obvious fact that compillng and interpreting are linguistic procedures and therefore that only in rare instances does a computer spend more time on mathematics than on linguistics. By now we all take the central position of our subject matter for granted. I express this overly familiar truth only for the pragmatic reason that some familiar truths are more helpful than others in preparing for a given discourse.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="2"> Syntax needs semantic Justification, but semantics has the inherent Justification that knowledge is power. The semantic Justification of syntax is easy: Who would try to represent knowledge without a good gr~--,-r? I have not yet found a better illustration than the tlmstable~ an example that I have used for some years now. Without rules of arrangement and interpretation, the timetable collapses into a llst of places, the digits 0,..9, a~d a few speclal symbols. Almost all of the information in a timetable is conveyed by the syntax, and one suspects that the same is true of the languages of brains, minds, and computers.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="3"> Syntax needs more than semantic Justification, and pra 8m-tlcs is ready to serve. Without pragmatic Justification, the difference between cognitive and syntactic structures is ridiculous. We may find more Justifiers later, but the rediscovery of pragmatlce is a boon to those who grow tired of hearing language maligned, It is easy to make fun of Engllsh , the language of Shakes spears, Bertrand Russell, and modern science. But the humor sometimes depends on the ignorance of the Joker.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="4"> We find first semantic, then prasmatic, and perhaps later other kinds of Justification for the quirkiness of English and other languages, and the Jokes loss their point.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="5"> Form, not content, admits of calculation. Since Aristotle proceeded in accordance with this rule, I find it surprising that John Locke omitted mention of the simple ideas in reflectlon. (One may recall that Locke knew of simple ideas in perceptlon~-~ellow, warm# amoot~nd considered knowledge to derive from perception and reflection.) Listing the sidle ideas in reflection selml in fact to be a task for our century, anticipated in part in the L9th century. Predication, Ins~an~isClonp membership, component, g, denoCation~ localization, moralization are some candidates that presently show strength. Content, not form, dlsamblguates, A more precise statement is that specific and not general knowledge fixes our interpretations of what we encounter, certainly in language and probably also in other channels of peroeptlon. Thus the great body of knowledge of our culture I of the individual mind, or of the ~asslve database makes lends an appearance of fixedness and stability to the world that simpler minds, cultures, and co~uters cannot get. The general rules of syntax, semantics, and pragmatlcs define the thinkable, allowing ambiguity wheQ some specific issue comes up. In a hash house or a conversation, understanding and trust come with complete and exact information.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="6"> Conversation is a social activity. The thinking computer (Raphael's title) may be an artificial mind, but the conversing computer (William D. Orr's cltle) is an artificial person and must accept the obligations of social converse. Those obligations are massive: &amp;quot;to do justice and love mercy*', &amp;quot;to do unto others as you would have them do unto you&amp;quot;, to act only as ic would be well for all to act, to express fully and concisely what is relevant, &amp;quot;to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing hut the truth&amp;quot;.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="7"> Trust precedes learning. Lest anyone suppose chat I have listed the precepts of our greatest masters in a spirit of fun, I hasten to add this obvious truth from study of our species. Whether the sciences be called social, behavioral, or human, they tell us that one accepts knowledge for one's own store only from sources that can be trusted. Nor could wisdom dictate the opposite, since internalized knowledge is inaccessible to test and correction. null Is the computer worthy of trust? I have asked this question of students, grading the context from simple arithmetic trust (they trust their pocket calculators to give accurate sums and products) co complex personal trust (they would not accept the computer as a friend). We have, I chink, no experience with computers that are functionally worthy of crust in any but simple matters. We may be learning to make computers follow the masters' precepts in conversation. Whether their users will ever accept them for what they are worth is hard to predict. If computers grow trustworthy and are assigned important tasks, then when crisis occurs the issue of trust may determine such outcomes as war or peace. Thus the issue is not frivolous.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="8"> Trust arises from knowledge of origin as well as from knowledge of functional capacity. Genetic and cultural history provide enormous confirmation that a neighbor can be trusted, beyond even broad experience. We can gain only a little knowledge about a friend in the course of a friendship, but we can bring to bear all of our own inherent mechanisms of trust for those that look and smell llke us when crisis occurs.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="9"> The six papers in this session, written by human beings and selected by persons of authority~ deserve sufficient true~ that the reader may learn from them. The systems that they describe may grow into knowledgeable, semantically and pragmatically effective, syntactically well-formed conversents. Their contributions are to that end, and have the advantage that, by seeking to apply knowledge they can detect its limits.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="10"> Science needs application, since contact with reallt 7 tends to realnd us scientists that there are more things out there than are dreamed of in our theories.</Paragraph>
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